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IMPROVING EDUCATION THROUGH DEVOTION:
A RELIGIOUS SOLUTION TO EASTERN
TURKEY’S GENDER GAP
ABSTRACT
Turkey has much room for improvement regarding women’s
education opportunities—particularly in eastern Anatolia. Despite
the Turkish Republic’s outward secular appearance, Islamic law
plays an increasingly important role in society. A potential solution
to the government’s sluggish progress on gender equality may lie in
the utilization of their religious directorate (Diyanet). The Diyanet
could issue fatwas sympathetic to women’s rights, which may more
effectively reach the conservative eastern Turkish population.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2016, a bloody coup attempt against the demo-
cratically elected Turkish government drew the world’s attention. Os-
tensibly, the military responded to what it perceived as the slow creep
of Islamist policies within secular Turkey.1 The coup highlighted for
1. See Mustafa Akyol, Who Was Behind the Coup Attempt in Turkey?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/opinion/who-was-behind-the-coup
-attempt-in-turkey.html? [https://perma.cc/2QYD-G6RT].
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the world the simmering tensions between conservative and liberal
Islamic philosophies in Turkey. As the only predominantly Muslim
nation to adopt secularism as a founding legal principle, the implica-
tions for the Turkish legal system are legion.2 The cultural and legal
impacts reverberate across Turkish society and may affect the
rights of Turkish women.3 Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoðan’s
administration and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP),
Turkey has made significant progress in the field of women’s rights.4
For example, during the 2004 amendments to the Civil Code, the
AKP included comments from women’s rights organizations.5 Ulti-
mately, the AKP advocated for and passed thirty amendments that
directly benefited the status of Turkish women.6 Amendments such
as Article 105 now explicitly define sexual harassment generally
and in the workplace.7 Nevertheless, there is much room for im-
provement with regard to, for example, the advancement of women’s
rights concerning education.
While this Note does not call for the implementation of Sharia
law for the secular Turkish legal system, it would be naive to ignore
the swinging pendulum of change. President Erdoðan’s politics indi-
cate that the AKP—and the political base—support a more tradi-
tional, Islamic interpretation of the law.8 This Note advocates for
the adoption of progressive fatwas9 directed at improving the gender
gap in education within Eastern Turkey.10 This solution provides
President Erdoðan and the religiously conservative AKP with an
Islamic-rooted framework that both comports with Islamic legal
2. See BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG? THE CLASH BETWEEN ISLAM AND
MODERNITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 106 (2002).
3. See Akyol, supra note 1.
4. See Seval Yildirim, Gender and Resistance in Turkey: On Myths of Liberty and
Salvation, 18 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 399, 416 (2016).
5. Id. at 417.
6. See, e.g., Metin Yeðenoðlu & Simten Coºar, The AKP and the Gender Issue:
Shuttling between Neoliberalism and Patriarchy, in SILENT VIOLENCE: NEOLIBERALISM,
ISLAMIST POLITICS AND THE AKP YEARS IN TURKEY 181 (Simten Coºar & Gamze Yücesan-
Özdemir eds., 2012).
7. Turkish Criminal Code, Law No.: 5237 Official Gazette, art. 105, 12 Oct. 2004 No.
25611, enacted: 26 Sept. 2004.
8. See Ömer Taºpýnar, Turkey: The New Model?, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-the-new-model [https://perma.cc/NLB5-DQUB]
(commenting that before the AKP, all of Turkey’s Islamic political parties were shut
down by either military coup or judicial decree, yet this party has survived and flourished).
9. A fatwa is a legal response to a specif ic question; fatwa authors employ several
jurisprudential tools to justify their legal opinion. See Mona Siddiqui, Mahr: Legal Ob-
ligation or Rightful Demand?, 6 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 14, 14 (1995).
10. As the Note will address, only muftis or other members of the Ulema are qualified
to issue fatwas and conduct Islamic jurisprudence. Consequently, any analysis of Islamic
texts within this Note is offered for academic purposes and not intended as any form of
actual jurisprudence.
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teachings (satisfying conservative constituents) and one that empow-
ers women with specific educational opportunities. There is room for
slight, methodical variations within the Turkish government that
can achieve both ends. A move for change is all the more significant,
as a signatory of United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Turkey has a legal obli-
gation to put policies into practice and submit national reports every
four years to the U.N.11 Strong advancement on gender equality keeps
Turkey in good favor with the U.N. and EU,12 which provides Presi-
dent Erdoðan and the AKP with positive press and more political
capital and provides much-deserved opportunities to Turkish women.
First, this Note will identify the successes and roadblocks of the
Turkish educational system concerning women. Second, the Note
will briefly detail the mechanics of Islamic jurisprudence and its
contrasts with the secular Turkish legal system, including the cre-
ation of Turkey’s fatwa-issuing13 Religious Directorate. Finally, the
Note will advocate for specific educational policies via fatwa, sup-
ported by the HanafI school and Shia legal school.
I. THE TURKISH EDUCATION SYSTEM AND WOMEN
A. The Education System Structure
In modern Turkey, “[e]ducation through age 14 or the eighth
grade is free, universal, and compulsory.”14 The nation improved
education with drastic changes to its civil code in 2002.15 Part of
President Erdoðan’s educational reforms during this time centered
on “raising pious generations” through a refocusing away from tra-
ditional, secular educational models in favor of a more religious
orientation.16 The 2012 reforms also eliminated the Ministry of
11. Press Release: Turkey Is Only Society in Islamic World Where State Abandoned
Shariah, Delegation Tells Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee, U.N. Press Release
WOM/935 (Jan. 17, 1997), http://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19970117.wom935.html
[https://perma.cc/MP26-EU8G].
12. See Firdevs Melis Cin & Melanie Walker, Reconsidering girls’ education in Turkey
from a capabilities and feminist perspective, 49 INT’L J. EDUC. DEV. 134, 136 (2016).
13. See Siddiqui, supra note 9.
14. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, TURKEY:
2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 34 (Apr. 8, 2011), https://www
.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154455.htm [https://perma.cc/Q6MZ-7TEX] [herein-
after COUNTRY REPORT].
15. See Svante E. Cornell, The Islamization of Turkey: Erdoðan’s Education Reforms,
TURK. ANALYST (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-ana
lyst-articles/item/437-the-islamization-of-turkey-erdo%C4%9Fan%E2%80%99s-edu
cation-reforms.html [https://perma.cc/EQ6G-MPYH].
16. Id.
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Education’s cosponsorship of imam training in secondary schools.17
Now, the Turkish Government’s Religious Directorate (Diyanet) has
exclusive control over several hours per day of religious instruction
for each Turkish student.18 As for 2012 reforms that directly impact
women’s education, one law permits parents to homeschool their
children beginning in the fourth grade; in rural areas, however, this
causes many families to pull their young girls out of state-run schools
so they may conduct domestic labor at home.19
As of 2015, the Turkish government has achieved a primary edu-
cation rate of 97.08% for males and 97.12% for females.20 These statis-
tical achievements, however, fail to account for the gender differences
in full-time and part-time attendance; women are much more fre-
quently out of school than their male counterparts.21
Since the AKP’s rise to power, Turkish schools have increased
their levels of religious education.22 The imam-hatip high schools are
public schools that provide a combination of general higher educa-
tion and preparatory training for religious staff.23 According to
government sources, most Turks send their children to such schools
to receive a modern education.24 The government asserts that such
schools are partly responsible for the positive numbers concerning
greater access for women in the educational system.25 Yet, these
reforms have done little to impact swaths of young women in the
less urban eastern half of Turkey.26
B. Women in Eastern Turkey
The Turkish government has made several important interna-
tional commitments to women’s rights, but Turkish laws are “often
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Cin & Walker, supra note 12, at 136.
21. Id. at 134 (positing that many Turkish families in eastern Anatolia must migrate
for work and keep their young girls at home as a source of free labor); see ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2013, TURKEY (2013), http://www.oecd
-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2013_eag-2013-en [https://perma.cc/4VSP
-9XD8] [hereinafter EDUCATION AT A GLANCE] (stating that between the ages of 15 through
29, 50 percent of Turkish women are neither employed nor in education or training com-
pared to just 20 percent of men).
22. See BEKIR S. GÜR, WHAT ERDOÐAN REALLY WANTS FOR EDUCATION IN TURKEY:
ISLAMIZATION OR PLURALIZATION? 2 (2016), http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Docu
ments/2016/3/17/c2a0ade5d313404ab8500c9ebb0375d3_100.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EQT-
9B82] (including imams and hatips (orators/preachers)).
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Cin & Walker, supra note 12, at 140.
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enacted without full consideration for their impact on gender equal-
ity or women’s political and economic participation.” 27 As Turkey’s
secular legal tradition embraces a “collectivist society,” cultural and
legal values shift dramatically as one migrates from West to East
Turkey.28 Unlike its modern and economically wealthy twin, the
eastern half of Turkey is more rural and much more conservative in
cultural attitudes and Islamic interpretation.29
Further, eastern Turkey lacks many basic infrastructural fa-
cilities that make it difficult for students of both genders to attend
regular schooling.30 The influence of Islamic norms and religious
pressure from the conservative sector has resulted in the disparate
treatment of women as compared to men.31 Evidencing this conser-
vative trend, “only 17% of . . . girls who attend[] compulsory schooling
for . . . [g]rades 1–8 continue . . . [on] to high schools or vocational
schools”—a rate much lower than that of their male counterparts.32
On the surface, the male-to-female dropout rate is sixty-six percent
to seventy-two percent, respectively.33 This gap widens, however, in
the East. Turkey’s gender gap overall places it 130th out of 145 coun-
tries, according to the 2015 Global Gender Gap Index of the World
Economic Forum.34 “Turkey ranks 105th in educational attainment,
105th in political empowerment, and 131th (sic) in economic partici-
pation and opportunity.” 35
Now, with the recent military coup attempt, the shift towards
a more hardline Islamic government particularly jeopardizes women’s
educational opportunities and independence from men. One Turkish
academic, Aysel Çelikel, head of the Support for Contemporary Living
Association, or ÇYDD, stated that “the high increase in the number
of murdered women stems from gender inequality and Turkey’s
27. UN Women presents gender review of key laws to Turkish Parliament, U.N. WOMEN
(May 12, 2016), http://eca.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2016/05/un-women-presents-gen
der-review-of-key-laws-to-turkish-parliament [https://perma.cc/49TF-2ZNS] [hereinafter
U.N. WOMEN].
28. Cin & Walker, supra note 12, at 137.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 135.
31. See id. at 137 (stating that “women occupy subordinate places to males; they
carry out household activities in the private sphere; female leisure activities within the
public sphere are not tolerated . . . [and] [m]ale superiority is maintained through
honour and shame codes.”); EDUCATION AT A GLANCE, supra note 21, at 1; John O’Dwyer
et al., Expanding educational access in Eastern Turkey: A new initiative, 30 INT’L J.
EDUC. DEV. 193, 200 (2010).
32. O’Dwyer et al., supra note 31, at 200–01.
33. Id. at 193.
34. WORLD ECON. FORUM, TURKEY (2015), https://reports.weforum.org/global-gender
-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=TUR [https://perma.cc/F4T7-2MC2].
35. U.N. WOMEN, supra note 27.
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increasingly conservative society.”36 Çelikel observed that “[w]omen’s
rights are [moving] backward as much as [religious] conservatism is
increasing in society.”37 The rising conservative tide has dire, physical
implications for Turkish women.38 Further, education plays a direct
role in the level of safety a woman may expect as “[s]ome 55.8 percent
of women who have no education or have not finished primary edu-
cation are subjected to violence, while 27.2 percent of women with
at least a high school diploma or higher are the victims . . . .” 39
In rural Turkey, gendered norms of the conservative population
severely constrain access to education for girls, as many families see
“the co-educational school as a serious threat, attach little value to
girls’ education, or fear that their family honour might be damaged
if someone molests their daughters.” 40 This conservative interpreta-
tion encourages girls to see education as irrelevant for them and to
develop lower aspirations about education.41 Young girls internalize
this cultural sentiment, causing a lack of enthusiasm for education.42
The conservative attitude silences the girls and forces them to adapt
to families’ conservative preferences and limit what is possible in
their lives.43 The aforementioned statistics strongly indicate that the
AKP’s educational policies are failing in eastern Turkey. Specifi-
cally, the dropout rates and violence against young women illustrate
a central government unable to improve the situation. Acknowledg-
ing secularism’s failed attempt, a religious framework may offer a
more effective solution to Turkey’s educational gender gap.
II. ISLAMIC AND TURKISH LAW
A. An Overview of Islamic Jurisprudence
While those unfamiliar with Islam believe Islamic law (sharia)
and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) are similar concepts, this is a
36. Murder a fact of life for women in Turkey, GREEK TURKISH FORUM HOME (Feb. 21,
2011), https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/greekturkishfr/murder-a-fact-of-life-for-women
-in-turkey-t10630.html [https://perma.cc/H4BL-DJXF].
37. Id.
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to physical and sexual violence. Women at a “low-income level” are assaulted
at a rate of 49.9 percent, while the number for higher-income women is still
high, at 28.7 percent.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Cin & Walker, supra note 12, at 140.
41. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 287 (2000).
42. See id.
43. Id. at 288–89.
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misnomer.44 Sharia encompasses the rituals, religious beliefs, and
legal framework of Islam; conversely, fiqh is a subset of sharia and
pertains to the understanding of sharia, or legal theory.45 The
Qur’an is the bedrock of the classical Islamic legal system.46 With
over 500 verses pertaining to legal matters, however, the text is not
comprehensive.47 To fill this gap, Islamic legal scholars rely on the
words and deeds of the Prophet, or Sunnah.48 Followers passed the
Prophet’s words and deeds from generation to generation through
oral tradition.49 Scholars call this the hadith and require the reciter
to list along with the Prophet’s words the entire oral chain linking
the speaker with the Prophet.50
Under Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, if a problem were to arise
in the community, the parties would appeal to the “scholars in theo-
logy and law” called ulema.51 The adjudicator would consult with
either the Qur’an or hadith.52 If these two sources failed to provide
an adequate answer, then the judges could use other items in the
Islamic jurisprudence toolkit: analogy (qiyas) or community (ijma).53
Interpreters often use qiyas for unprecedented legal questions by
comparing the contemporary situation to a ruling that pertains to
an existing case of law.54 More than any other form of legal interpre-
tation, qiyas offer scholars and judges the widest latitude when
interpreting cases involving progressive or new ideas.55
Today, Islamic jurists often use reasoning from the Qur’an and
Sunnah to derive new rules of law—a process called ijtihad.56 The
44. Hossein Esmaeili, The Nature and Development of Law in Islam and the Rule of
Law Challenge in the Middle East and the Muslim World, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 329, 340
(2011).
45. Id.
46. Christopher Melchert, Islamic Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 901, 902 (1998).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts
and the Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 589 n. 55 (2010).
52. Melchert, supra note 46, at 902.
53. Id. at 903.
54. Carl Sharif El-Tobgui, The Epistemology of Qiyas and Ta’lil Between the
Mu’tazilite Abu ‘L-Husayn Al-Basri and Ibn Hazm Al-Zahiri, 2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR
EASTERN L. 201, 281 n.1 (2002–03).
55. Id. at 282.
56. L. ALI KHAN & HISHAM M. RAMADAN, CONTEMPORARY IJTIHAD: LIMITS AND CON-
TROVERSIES 1 (2011). Until recently, most legal scholars considered the Ottoman period
to have closed the “gate of ijtihad” and have mechanically applied Islamic law without
much consideration for contemporary customs; modern scholars such as Wael Hallaq,
however, have thoroughly proved through detailed Ottoman court records that ijtihad
was widely accepted and practiced. See JUDITH E. TUCKER, IN THE HOUSE OF THE LAW:
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process of ijtihad “cannot be used to undermine or modify the Qur’an
or the Prophet’s Sunnah.”57 Nevertheless, it does allow modern Mus-
lim nations “to use [certain] sources of law, such as constitutions
and legislation, [which are] compatible with Islamic divine texts.” 58
One, therefore, may bifurcate Islamic law into two groups: divine
texts (Qur’an and Sunnah) and Islamic positive law (customs, stat-
utes, and case law).59 The first group is sacred and unchanged for all
eternity, whereas various Islamic societies located in different areas,
time periods, and cultures may mold Islamic positive law.60 Modern
day ijtihad “argues that Islamic law is inherently fluid and evolu-
tionary within the bounds of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah,”61
and Turkey’s molding of Islamic legal tradition is no exception.
Turkish legal history has a long relationship with another
aspect of Islamic jurisprudence: takhayyur. The term takhayyur
means the selection and preference of a particular ruling or opinion
from a madhhab62 for the purpose of legislation and enforcement.63
Takhayyur was a popular convention among Ottoman authorities
during the codification of the Mejelle in 1876 and other laws because
it allowed legal scholars to select convenient legal principles from
different schools.64 In the modern era, takhayyur is widely used as
“a means of flexibility and choice among the rulings of the existing
madhhabs.” 65 Under Ottoman rule, Turkish Islamic scholars pri-
marily subscribed to the HanifI School of legal interpretation—
eventually producing Íânûnnâmes (codification of Ottoman dynastic
GENDER AND ISLAMIC LAW IN OTTOMAN SYRIA AND PALESTINE 11 (1998); see generally Wael
B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT’L J. MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 3 (1984).
57. KHAN & RAMADAN, supra note 56, at 1.
58. Id. at 1–2.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3. See generally Shaista P. Ali-Karamali & Fiona Dunne, The Ijtihad Con-
troversy, 9 ARAB L. Q. 238 (1994).
62. A madhhab is a school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence. See Christie S.
Warren, Lifting the Veil: Women and Islamic Law, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 33, 52
(2008); The Amman Message, AMMANMESSAGE.COM, http://ammanmessage.com/the-am
man-message-full [https://perma.cc/FWG2-DPPJ] (confirming in 2005 that Islamic scholars
recognize four Sunni schools (HanafI, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali) and two Shia schools
(Ja'fari and Zaido) and the Ibadi and Zahiri School)).
63. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah And Civil Law: Towards A Methodology
of Harmonization, 14 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 391, 406 (2007).
64. Id. The Mejelle was the Ottoman Civil Code, which acted as “a digest or restate-
ment of the law.” Ya’akov Meron, The Mejelle Tested by its Application, 5 ISR. L. REV. 203,
203 (1970).
65. Kamali, supra note 63, at 406. Several different Islamic schools of thought
bloomed after the disillusionment in the Islamic world during the mid-seventh to mid-
eighth centuries. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 2 (1982).
2018] IMPROVING EDUCATION THROUGH DEVOTION 673
law).66 Hence, from an early stage, Turkish rulers employed the
Hanifists to combine secular and religious laws for the good of the
empire.67 At times, the Ottoman state endorsed fatwas from local
religious scholars.68
A fatwa is a religious ruling from a mufti, which is a religious
scholar.69 Traditionally, Muslims would ask the mufti for a legal
opinion on a specific matter; the mufti would then use all of his
mental power to provide an opinion that conformed to the tenets of
Islamic law.70 The opinion, called a fatwa, was not binding on the
recipients.71 The method of legal interpretation, however, can create
a binding fatwa. Generally, fatwas created using ijtihad are consid-
ered non-binding because a mufti could arrive at an incorrect answer;
the Prophet did not want to bind believers to an erroneous deci-
sion.72 In contrast, fatwas that are the result of ijma may become
binding as long as the scholarly community remains in agreement.73
Aside from the method of fatwa creation (ijtihad versus ijma), schol-
ars could also choose which texts to rely upon.74
The HanafI jurists issued fatwas based on a wide range of
interpretive methods. The Ottoman jurist Khayr al-Din often used
a mix of traditional and progressive sources when drafting a fatwa.75
Occupying the other end of the HanafI fatwa spectrum, the scholar
al-Imadi stayed closer to the traditional, authoritative texts, rarely
straying from accepted legal sources.76 The new Turkish democratic
government would maintain this tradition despite the Ataturk Na-
tionalists’ best efforts to stamp it out.77
Finally, in classical Islam, the ability to issue a fatwa was not
granted to just anyone—only muftis retained this knowledge and
66. Samy Ayoub, We’re Not in Kûfa Anymore: The Construction of Late Hanafism
in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, 16th–19th Centuries CE 28 (2014) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona).
67. Id. at 28–29; see HAIM GERBER, STATE, SOCIETY, AND LAW IN ISLAM: OTTOMAN LAW
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 62 (1994).
68. Ayoub, supra note 66, at 15.
69. Salma Taman, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 16 EUR. J.L. REFORM 221, 242
(2014).
70. Id.
71. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE SEARCH FOR BEAUTY IN ISLAM: A CONFERENCE
OF THE BOOKS 46 (2006).
72. See Taman, supra note 69, at 240.
73. See id. at 233.
74. Id. at 241.
75. See TUCKER, supra note 56, at 16–17 (stating that al-Din would cite authority from
the Qur’an, contemporary fatwas, and even local custom when generating his own fatwas).
76. Id. at 17.
77. See Elliot Ackerman, Atatürk Versus Erdoðan: Turkey’s Long Struggle, NEW
YORKER (July 16, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/ataturk-versus-er
dogan-turkeys-long-struggle [https://perma.cc/R3AG-JHW6].
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authority.78 Scholars from the ulama also performed the role of mufti
to issue juristic opinions for individuals much in the same way that
people seek out legal advice from lawyers in the modern period.79
The muftis set their own professional standards without much gov-
ernment regulation.80 Due to the non-binding nature of fatwas, a
Muslim dissatisfied with a mufti’s ruling is free to ask a second or
third mufti for another fatwa.81 In the modern period, however, some
governments have regulated the qualifications for muftis and use
statutory authority to give fatwas binding authority over the Mus-
lim population.82 The Turkish government, however, has no statu-
tory authority placing fatwas on the level of civil law; fatwas are
non-binding, and Turkish Muslims must decide whether to imple-
ment them.83
B. Women in Traditional Islamic Jurisprudence
As the foundational text for Islam, the Qur’an plainly supports
the equality of men and women: “Men and women who have submit-
ted, believed, obeyed, are truthful, steadfast, reverent, giving in char-
ity, fasting, guarding their private parts and remembering Allah
often, Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and a great reward.”84
Viewed through the lens of seventh-century Arabia, the Qur’an was
uniquely progressive in the field of gender equality, bestowing new
legal rights on women such as financial support during divorce,
property inheritance rights, and full contract rights as a party in a
legal agreement.85 In the beginning of the Islamic era, women were
just as educated as many men, held professional jobs, and participated
in war and combat.86 The Prophet’s revelation illuminated a path
78. TUCKER, supra note 56, at 13–14.
79. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 174 (2008).
80. Id. at 175.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 s. 9 (Malay.).
83. M. Hakan Yavuz, Turkey: Islam without Shari’a?, in SHARI’A POLITICS: ISLAMIC
LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE MODERN WORLD 146, 164 (Robert W. Hefner ed., 2011). Another
Muslim-majority democracy, Indonesia, has a similar arrangement where state-sponsored
muftis or imams generate fatwas for the nation that are non-binding. Although, there
is debate whether Law No. 19 of 2008 concerning Sharia securities does, in fact, constitute
a binding regulation independent of state legislation. See Mujaid Kumkelo et al., Har-
monization Patterns and Positivism of Fatwa Into Indonesian National Law: Study On The
Renewal Fatwa of Mui In Islamic Law, 41 J. L., POL’Y & GLOBALIZATION 232, 238 (2015).
84. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE QUR’AN 423 (Majid Fakhry trans., 2000); see also THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE QUR’AN 255 (Jane Dammen McAuliffe ed., 3d ed. 2008).
85. FARID ESACK, THE QUR’AN: A USER’S GUIDE 180–81 (2005).
86. Afaf Marsot, Book Review, 15 J. L. & RELIGION 525, 525 (2000–01) (reviewing
HAIFAA A. JAWAD, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM: AN AUTHENTIC APPROACH (1998)).
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toward women’s rights and gender democracy.87 At times, the Qur’an
is quite specific concerning women’s legal rights: “. . . and women
have rights equal to what is incumbent upon them according to
what is just . . . .” 88 Much of what the Prophet Muhammad initially
taught “was quickly modified . . . or completely lost as the political
leaders and scholars of the first few centuries of Islam shaped
tradition . . . .”89 The devil to equality, so to speak, was in the details.
The Qur’an makes numerous references to the equality of men
and women; many Muslim feminists argue that a gender-neutral
belief system lies at the center of Islam and that centuries of male-
dominated legal interpretation have obscured it.90 Scholars argue
that the traditional verse-by-verse method of Qur’anic study, com-
bined with its domination by male practitioners, marginalized female
scholarly access to understanding revelation.91 This almost exclu-
sively male club of legal scholars, therefore, caused “the suppression
of the Qur’an’s message of gender equality.”92 Ironically, many women
served as a large donor group for Islamic legal education during the
early centuries of Islam.93 Fatima Mernissi, in The Veil and the Male
Elite, instead argues that stricter forms of interpretation prevailed
because male scholars feared subjectivity— leaving the door “wide
open to the manipulation of revelation through interpretation.” 94 She
does recognize, however, that not all scholars spoke of women in the
same misogynistic voice.95 Nevertheless, the interpretive vehicle
matters—whether a strict reading of the Sunnah or broader use of
qiyas and ijtihad. As noted above, female voices have firm, histori-
cal roots in Islam. Consequently, the Turkish religious establish-
ment could harness this powerful narrative for positive change.
87. TUCKER, supra note 56, at 3.
88. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE QUR’AN, supra note 84, at 40.
89. TUCKER, supra note 56, at 3.
90. Mohammad Fadel, Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in
Medieval Sunni Legal Thought, 29 INT. J. MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 185–204 (1997).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Ann Lambton, Awqâf in Persia: 6th–8th/12th–14th Centuries, 4 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y
298, 300 (1997) (“Although the ultimate purpose of a waqf had to be charitable the objects
to which, and the beneficiaries to whom, the proceeds might be given, were many and var-
ious. The founders of awqâf were both rich and poor, powerful and weak. Those for which
we have records are mainly awqâf made by the rich and powerful for the benefit of ma-
drasas, mosques, hospitals and other public buildings, often constructed by themselves—
the age was one of great buildings. . . . [L]ocal rulers, their ministers and others [founded
many awqâf ] in the 6th–8th/12th–14th centuries in Yazd, Fârs and Kirmân. A notable
feature is the number made by women.”).
94. See Fadel, supra note 90, at 185.
95. Id.
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C. The Turkish Legal System and Religious Directorate
In contrast to traditional Islamic law, secularism is the founda-
tion for the Turkish Constitution and legal system.96 The Turkish
judicial system is an amalgamation of Western legal systems—
mostly continental European.97 The system is almost devoid of any
Eastern or religious viewpoints.98 This was not always so.
Before Ataturk, the Ottoman period saw the first transition
from state-sponsored Islamic law under the absolute rule of the
Sultan to a more Westernized rule of law.99 In particular, the Otto-
man reformers saw Islam as a roadblock to their plans to convert
the military, legal system, and government into a more European-
based model.100 It was not until the collapse of the empire and ratifi-
cation of the constitution in the twentieth century that the Turkish
state fully embraced Western secularism.101
After the Assembly ratified the new Turkish Constitution in
1924, they amended the document four years later to remove any
mention of Islam as the state religion.102 The constitutional framers
realized, however, that if they completely purged Islam from the
government, Islam would grow unchecked and “inevitably retain its
hold over the society.”103 From the 1928 framers to the 1982 consti-
tutional assembly, therefore, Islam has enjoyed a small presence
within the Turkish government under the control of the constitu-
tionally created Directorate of Religious Affairs, otherwise known
as the Diyanet.104
Despite the existence of the Diyanet, Turkey still enjoys a
relatively Western judiciary. The constitutional framers heavily
molded the Turkish legal system after the Continental System.105
96. Ackerman, supra note 77.
97. See Esin Örücü, A Synthetic and Hyphenated Legal System: The Turkish Ex-
perience, 1 J. COMP. L. 261, 261–62 (2006) (stating “[t]he legal culture is a synthesis of
predominantly Swiss, German, Italian and French legal cultures”).
98. Id. at 261.
99. See Ihsan Yilmaz, State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey,
95 MUSLIM WORLD 385, 387–88 (2005).
100. Id. at 386–87.
101. Id. at 387.
102. See INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 31 (Tuðrul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. eds.,
5th ed. 2005).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 31–32 (eight principle reform laws are offered permanent protection from
the Constitutional Court in order to maintain certain secular ideals within the govern-
ment: secular education and civil marriage, use of the Turkish alphabet and numerals,
free use of the hat, abolition of dervish convents, removing certain titles, and outlawing
certain garments).
105. Id. at 13.
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Yet, because prior cases from higher courts are not binding—as in
the English/American systems—there is a strong legal tradition to
follow prior rulings from the Constitutional Court.106 Judges are to
evaluate laws based not on Islamic jurisprudence, but through the
Constitution and statutes.107 The judiciary, therefore, operates as
the traditional “check” on the other branches of government com-
monly seen in the West.108 This does not mean, however, that the
system is completely devoid of any Islamic influence.
The Constitution forbids Islamic law within the Turkish legal
system, yet the Diyanet “bases its arguments on officially non-
recognized Islamic legal and jurisprudential sources.”109 Employing
ijtihad and takhayyur, the Diyanet has issued fatwas on all manner
of issues.110 Despite the State’s efforts to bifurcate political Islam
and personal Islam, “it is practically impossible to keep the distance
between the civic domain and the religious any longer.”111 Notably,
the government statutorily charges the Diyanet with the adminis-
tration and maintenance of the religious apparatus; adjudicating
legal cases, however, remains outside of its mandate.112 This separa-
tion effectively ended the presence of Sharia law in the adjudication
of everyday disputes,113 but Islamic jurisprudence remains crucial
to the Diyanet’s other mission-administering Islam.
The Diyanet acts as the government’s religious ministry, report-
ing directly to the Prime Minister, and the ministry is responsible
for 86,000 mosques and the salaries of the imams, muftis, and
muezzins.114 The secular Turkish state retains tight control over
religion and leaves “imams with little leeway to create their own
interpretation of religion.”115 Since 2010, the AKP has quadrupled
106. Id.
107. Id. at 42.
108. INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW, supra note 102, at 42.
109. Yilmaz, supra note 99, at 391.
110. Id. at 391, 393–94 (stating that the HCRA’s fatwas have commented on “fasting and
traveling by train, the stock exchange, taxes, haläl meat, marrying non-Muslims, . . .
court divorce, polygamy, nationalism, unemployment benefits, inflation, interest, customs
taxes, bribery, depositing money in banks in non-Muslim countries, selling alcohol in
non-Muslim countries, gambling in dâr al-harb, sterilization, plastic surgery, using per-
fumes, abortion, ijtihad, military service, organ transplantation, prayers (salät) on buses,
VATs, mortgages, European Union, golden teeth, alcohol in medication, eau de cologne,
interest, inflation, insurance, feminism, nikâh, and fertility clinics.”).
111. Id. at 394.
112. Zana Çitak, Between ‘Turkish Islam’ and ‘French Islam:’ The Role of the Diyanet
in the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, 36 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 619, 621
(2010).
113. Istar B. Gözaydýn, Diyanet and Politics, 98 MUSLIM WORLD 216, 218 (2008).
114. Id.
115. DAVID SHANKLAND, ISLAM AND SOCIETY IN TURKEY 29 (1999).
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Diyanet’s budget to two billion dollars, with the “[d]irectorate now
issu[ing] fatwas on demand, as well as wading into political issues
and backing up . . . AKP position[s],” such as monitoring Turkish
immigrants.116 The AKP also permits the Diyanet to run a twenty-
four-hour news channel and maintain social media accounts across
several platforms.117 With President Erdoðan’s post-coup consolida-
tion of power, one can only imagine the Diyanet will become ever more
obedient to the conservative Islamic agenda.118 Therefore, under-
standing the Diyanet and fatwa interpretation by the Turkish com-
munity is paramount to understanding potential solutions to the
gender gap in Turkey’s educational system.
III. DELIVERANCE THROUGH THE DIYANET
The Turkish government has used the Diyanet to achieve politi-
cal and economic goals on previous occasions. The Diyanet created
the Coordination Committee of Muslim Turks in France to maintain
political oversight of Turkish immigrants abroad.119 As such, em-
ploying the Diyanet to create legally justifiable fatwas advancing
political goals such as women’s rights is not unrealistic or improba-
ble. The Diyanet is well-suited to draft the fatwas for a myriad of
reasons, namely the following: 1) religion plays an important role in
Eastern Turkey; 2) the HanafI school and Shia schools offer greater
elasticity; and 3) the directorate possesses immense financial and
cultural resources.
A. Religious Power in Eastern Turkey
Unlike its western twin, the eastern half of Anatolia is comprised
of a much more conservative and pluralistic population. This pluralism
and the differences between minority groups and the Sunni-majority
cause many to entrench themselves within their minority identity.
While the majority of Turks are Sunni Muslims, a significant Shia
population resides in eastern Turkey—some 300,000 people.120 Unlike
116. Svante Cornell, The Rise of Diyanet: the Politicization of Turkey’s Directorate of
Religious Affairs, TURK. ANALYST (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publi
cations/turkey-analyst-articles/item/463-the-rise-of-diyanet-the-politicization-of-tur
key%E2%80%99s-directorate-of-religious-affairs.html [https://perma.cc/49JA-W6U2]; see
also Çitak, supra note 112, at 620; David Lepeska, Turkey Casts the Diyanet: Ankara’s
Religious Directorate Takes Off, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 17, 2015), https://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-05-17/turkey-casts-diyanet [https://perma.cc/VFB6-SQK3].
117. Lepeska, supra note 116.
118. Cornell, supra note 116.
119. Çitak, supra note 112, at 620.
120. See Niyazi Öktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 371, 373–74 (2002).
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Sunni Muslims, the Shia believe that the Prophet’s nephew, Ali,
was his chosen successor and the first legitimate Caliph.121 The Shia
believe that the leader of the faith and the state must come from the
Prophet’s household; therefore, the Shia Imam exists without sin,
and he is considered infallible.122 During the end of the ninth cen-
tury, the twelfth Shia Imam disappeared, and the Shia await his
return.123 In the interim, Shia clerics rely heavily on ijtihad.124 The
Shia population of eastern Turkey subscribes to the Ja’fari school of
jurisprudence.125 This school places a heavy emphasis on ijtihad
and, unlike other minority schools, is widely respected as a source
of jurisprudence.126 In eastern Turkey, the Shia operate their own
mosques and employ approximately seventy imams in the region.127
Another religious group that maintains a similar devotion to
the lineage of Ali in eastern Turkey is the Alevis.128 Unlike the Shia,
however, Alevis do not fast during the Holy Month of Ramadan, they
do not participate in the pilgrimage to Mecca, nor do they pray five
times a day.129 Regarding the stature of women, the Alevis commu-
nity considers itself more “progressive” than the Sunni majority;
veils are not worn, nor are women segregated in the classroom or
workplace.130 By no means an insignificant minority, the Alevis ac-
count for almost twenty percent of the Turkish population.131 These
two religious groups, orthodox Shia and Alevis, together comprise
the religious majority in eastern Turkey.132
The Turkish government’s treatment of the Alevis minority in
eastern Turkey has produced suspicion and animosity. This mutual
distrust dates back to the Ottoman period when the central govern-
ment began to persecute segments of the Alevis population.133 During
121. See KAMALI, supra note 79, at 87.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 88.
124. Id. at 89.
125. See Pinar Tremblay, Turkish Shiites fear growing hate crimes, AL-MONITOR
(July 11, 2014), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/tremblay-turkish
-shiites-secterian-hate-crime-isis-syria.html [https://perma.cc/SD88-PAKB].
126. See The Amman Message: Summary, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE AMMAN MESSAGE,
http://ammanmessage.com/?option=com_content&task=section&id=5&Itemid=34
[https://perma.cc/69N6-8S2N].
127. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, TURKEY: INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2004
(2004), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35489.htm [https://perma.cc/BC7W-V7P2].
128. See generally David Zeidan, The Alevi of Anatolia, 3 MIDDLE EAST REV. INT’L AFF.
74 (1999).
129. Id. at 76.
130. Id.
131. SHANKLAND, supra note 115, at 136.
132. See Zeidan, supra note 128, at 74.
133. Albert Doja, A Political History of Bektashism from Ottoman Anatolia to Con-
temporary Turkey, 48 J. CHURCH & ST. 423, 434–35 (2006).
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the post-Ottoman Kemalist period, the Turkish government contin-
ued to view and treat the Alevis as a distinct “other” population,
resulting in a significant social gap between Sunnis and Alevis.134
The recent rise of Islamism within Turkey’s central government has
caused a resurgence in Alevis practices, with many believers found-
ing Alevis religious societies.135 In response to recent perceived
threats from Kurdish independence movements, Turkish national-
ists have attempted to claim the Alevis as a “pre-eminently Turkish
expression of Islam.”136 Under this recent dogmatic shift, therefore,
the government would consider all Alevis as ethnically and racially
Turkish.137 The Sunni-controlled Diyanet has coordinated a cam-
paign to persuade the Alevis that they are part of one Turkish
Muslim entity.138
B. HanafI Views on Women
Both the Shia schools and the HanafI School hold critical places
in any Islamic-centered solution for women’s advancement. As the
dominant school for Turkey’s Sunni population and the primary
school of the Diyanet, any solution must conform to HanafI juristic
principles.139 In many ways, the HanafI School appears more elastic
in its teachings than other Islamic legal schools. For instance, both
the Maliki and Shafi’i legal schools do not bestow an inherent right
on women to choose their own marriage partners without the consent
of a male protector.140 HanafI law, however, does permit a woman
“the right to give herself in marriage without recourse” to her male
protectors.141 From this relatively strong legal position, women—
according to the HanafI jurists—were additionally entitled to a larger
swath of property and inheritance rights.142 Although this area of
134. See DALE F. EICKELMAN, THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 286
(2nd ed. 1989); Zeidan, supra note 128, at 75.
135. Zeidan, supra note 128, at 78.
136. Martin van Bruinessen, 56 BIBLIOTHECA ORIENTALIS 246, 247 (1999) (reviewing
KARIN VORHOFF, ZWISCHEN GLAUBE, NATION UND NEUER GEMEINSCHAFT: ALEVITISCHE
IDENTITÄT IN DER TÜRKEI DER GEGENWART (1995)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Russell Powell, Evolving Views of Islamic Law in Turkey, 28 J. L. & RELIGION
467, 480 (2012–13).
140. Mona Siddiqui, The Concept of Wilaya in HanafI Law: Authority versus Consent
in al-Fatawa al-‘Alamgiri, 5 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN L. 171, 173 (1998).
141. Id. Although the HanafI School is arguably more liberal in this respect, it does
require that there be kafa’ah (equality between husband and wife). If kafa’ah is not
present, then male protectors may prevent the marriage. See also TUCKER, supra note
56, at 51 (explaining marriage arrangements for females under HanafI law).
142. Siddiqui, supra note 140, at 183–84.
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Islamic law contains strong elements of its patriarchal beginnings,
“[t]he HanafI notion . . . illustrates the importance of accepting and
respecting a woman’s right in some of the fundamental issues of
marriage.”143 These relatively liberal jurisprudential views may pro-
vide the necessary room to expand women’s political rights utilizing
a HanafI foundation.
C. Shia Schools’ View of Women
Despite significant differences in belief, the Shia schools hold
a similarly equal view of women’s rights to education as that of the
HanafI School. The predominant Shia school within eastern Turkey
is the Ja’fari school that places an emphasis on ijtihad by the
imams.144 This emphasis on ijtihad and independent reasoning has
permitted the Ja’fari school to remain quite flexible. For example,
unlike many of the other schools, Ja’faris “view mature women as
coequals with their male counterparts and legally competent to make
their own marriage decisions, regardless of their fathers’ approval.”145
This juristic opinion is not surprising, given the flexible nature of
ijtihad and the wide latitude afforded Shia imams as the Shia await
the return of the Hidden Imam.
D. Employing the Diyanet
Employing jurisprudence from both the HanafI and Ja’fari
schools, the Diyanet should issue progressive fatwas designed to
increase women’s access to education in eastern Turkey. First, the
Diyanet already operates the religious administration with flexibil-
ity and creativity. Second, the Diyanet has the resources necessary
to reach the target population. Third, the recent thaw in tensions
between the Diyanet and religious minorities makes now the opti-
mal time for reconciliation.
1. The Flexible Nature of the Diyanet
The Diyanet already possesses the necessary religious and
bureaucratic machinery to issue culturally progressive fatwas. It is
critical to note that the Diyanet does not limit its jurisprudence
strictly to the HanafI school.146 For example, the Diyanet broke with
143. Id. at 185.
144. Powell, supra note 139, at 475.
145. Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An
Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT’L L. J. 311, 326 n.97 (1995).
146. Powell, supra note 139, at 480.
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HanafI tradition when, in 2005, it appointed two women as vice-
muftis.147 In breaking with HanafI interpretation, the Diyanet seeks
a balance between secularism and republicanism, which may in-
clude muftis using broad public policy arguments.148
Aside from breaking with HanafI tradition, the Diyanet is also
able to employ takhayyur. The concept of takhayyur is not new to
the region and the Diyanet; talfiq, also called “patching,” permits the
combination of two separate Islamic schools to form one particular
ruling or doctrine.149 Turkish religious scholars have been familiar
with talfiq from the time of the Ottoman legal system. This ability to
choose interpretations from different schools empowers the Diyanet
to use the most progressive Ijtihad opinions from the Hanafi and
Ja’fari scholars. Such flexibility can yield cultural results that pro-
mote women’s education in eastern Turkey.
2. The Societal Influence of the Diyanet
Due to recent support from the AKP, the Diyanet retains an
immense amount of influence over Turkey. The Diyanet doubled its
staff to over 150,000 employees in 2015; the Diyanet budget is now
“40 percent more than the Ministry of the Interior’s and equal to
those of the Foreign, Energy, and Culture and Tourism ministries
combined.”150 The Turkish people and government perceive the
Diyanet as so important that, during the first few hours of the 2016
coup attempt, President Erdoðan ordered the Diyanet to play pro-
government prayers at all mosques.151 Within seconds, the Diyanet
sent President Erdoðan’s message to 110,000 religious personnel
across the nation.152
3. Opportunities for Reconciliation with the Diyanet
The issuance of progressive fatwas provides the Diyanet with
the opportunity to engage in a much-desired détente with religious
minorities. In the past decade, the Diyanet cultivated a negative
image among certain eastern Turkish minority groups.153 Most
147. Id.
148. Id. at 480–81.
149. See KAMALI, supra note 79, at 95.
150. Lepeska, supra note 116.
151. Pinar Tremblay, How Erdogan used the power of the mosques against coup
attempt, AL-MONITOR (July 25, 2016), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016
/07/turkey-coup-attempt-erdogan-mosques.html [https://perma.cc/WXF4-UBLS].
152. Id.
153. van Bruinessen, supra note 136, at 247.
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notably, Kurdish and Zaza elements within the Alevis population ve-
hemently resent the Diyanet.154 In a rebuff to the Diyanet’s Turkish
nationalism overtures, some Kurdish authors have “emphasized the
presence of Iranian elements in Alevism.”155 These groups perceive the
Diyanet as a Sunni-majority tool to control them and advocate for a
parallel directorate catering to the Alevis population.156 Further, the
Alevis do not receive any state funding through the Diyanet because
the Alevis worship in Cem Houses rather than state-run mosques.157
Rather than drive religious minorities away from the govern-
ment, the Diyanet could use the progressive fatwas as an inclusive
measure among eastern Turkey’s population. Adding Shia and
various Alevis imams to the Diyanet would provide the fatwas with
religious credibility and bolster the Diyanet’s tarnished image.
Given the Diyanet’s immense budget, the administration could
allocate funds to assist the Alevis religious establishment without
providing direct funding to the sensitive issue of Alevis Cem Houses.
4. Practical Applications of the Fatwas
Moving from the theoretical to the practical, the Diyanet should
apply the progressive fatwa strategy to two pressing issues concerning
women’s education: 1) government boarding schools, and 2) involun-
tary domestic vocations. Regarding boarding schools, the Turkish gov-
ernment initially established state-funded female primary boarding
schools for low-income girls in eastern Turkey.158 The AKP, however,
shut down these schools during the 2012–2013 educational reforms.159
Erdoðan stated, “it is pedagogically and psychologically more appro-
priate for children to stay with their families during their education
years in order to be raised in a family environment.”160
The 2012–2013 reforms were a “regressive step for girls’ educa-
tion since the majority of girls in these schools are from economically
and socially disadvantaged families where they have to [engage in]
domestic work, provide child labour, and are deterred from attend-
ing school.”161 Turkish Government data reflects that after the school
closings, the education gap widened—so too did the gender pay gap,
with data showing Turkish women falling drastically behind their
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Öktem, supra note 120, at 388.
158. Cin & Walker, supra note 12, at 135.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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male counterparts.162 Further, as of June 2017, the Turkish Govern-
ment estimated that “housewife” related duties excludes one-third
of working age adults from the workforce.163 Truly, the 2012–2013
AKP reforms caused a dramatic backslide among women’s education
opportunities in eastern Turkey.
Here, the Diyanet and a progressive fatwa may effect change.
As stated above, the minority religious groups of eastern Turkey are
receptive to broad and wide-ranging interpretations of Islam.164
Ja’fari ijtihad encased in a directorate fatwa could have wide-rang-
ing effects. Given the relatively liberal views of the HanafI School
concerning a woman’s need for a male protector, fatwas advocating
that girls attend boarding school could comport with traditional Is-
lamic interpretation.165 The Diyanet imams, practicing ijtihad, would
then need to ensure the fatwa contained the proper textual basis—
borrowing the style of their Ottoman predecessor, Khayr al-Din.166
Despite these apparent synergistic elements to the proposed
boarding school fatwa, conservative resistance is still likely. In con-
servative families, those preventing a woman from attending school
after the governmental discretionary period are very often close
male relatives.167 Though honor killings are rare in eastern Turkey
compared to other parts of the Middle East, they do occur.168 One
study reiterated the common understanding that the vast majority
of honor killings are perpetrated by a woman’s brothers, followed by
fathers, and then the fathers’ brothers and their sons.169
To protect those women who would become exposed to the risk
of honor killings because of their pursuit of boarding school, the fatwa
does provide a potential solution: “the role of the larger community
is very important in traditional honor killings; such killings are
highly unlikely unless the transgression becomes known in the com-
munity.”170 The fatwa’s impact here lies in mitigating the community’s
162. TURKISH STATISTICAL INST., http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=teme
list [https://perma.cc/A5B3-T597] (click “Employment, Unemployment, and Wages”; then
download the Excel spreadsheets).
163. Id.
164. Rosemary R. Hicks, Translating culture, transcending difference? Cosmopolitan
consciousness and SufI sensibilities in New York City after 2001, 10 J. ISLAMIC L. &
CULTURE 281, 288 (2008).
165. See Siddiqui, supra note 140, at 173.
166. See TUCKER, supra note 56, at 16–17.
167. See COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 14.
168. See id.
169. Gideon M. Kressel et al., Sororicide/Filiacide: Homicide for Family Honour, 22
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 141, 142–43 (1981).
170. Nancy V. Baker et al., Family Killing Fields: Honor Rationales in the Murder of
Women, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 164, 171 (1999).
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negative association with a woman leaving her family to live at an ed-
ucational institution. Diyanet imams have several Qur’annic verses
from which to choose, such as: “If any of your women [a]re guilty of
lewdness, Take the evidence of four (Reliable) witnesses from
amongst you [a]gainst them; and if they testify, [c]onfine them to
houses until [d]eath do claim them, [o]r Allah ordain for them [s]ome
(other) way.”171 This aya does not advocate for violence as a remedy to
perceived female impropriety.172 Rather, the harshest punishment is
a form of house arrest.173 As the foundation for any religious ruling,
this Qur’annic verse provides Diyanet imams with a reference point
for using ijtihad. Turkish laws against domestic violence and as-
sault in general may bolster a Diyanet imam’s progressive jurispru-
dence. The resulting fatwa would receive wide distribution among
the eastern Turkish community. Further, related fatwas based on
Qur’annic verses that advocate for women’s education could
strengthen the curriculums for both boys and girls in public schools.
Expanding the fatwa’s communications footprint, the religious minis-
try’s social media presence and weekly sermons on these matters
could provide significant coverage to reach most of eastern Turkey.
Not only could progressive fatwas provide women with safe
boarding schools, but a fatwa may also encourage rural families to
permit their daughters to participate in more schooling. Until the
eighth grade, Turkish boys and girls maintain roughly similar levels
of participation in public education.174 Around the ninth grade, how-
ever, participation levels diverge. The Ministry of Education admits
that many Turkish girls are unable to achieve their full economic
potential due to their involuntary employment in family-run agri-
cultural businesses.175 Many young girls work in agricultural sectors
not covered by current Turkish labor laws, “such as agricultural
workplaces with fewer than 50 workers or the informal economy.”176
The Turkish government’s legislative attempt to modify these laws
garnered little success.177
In response to the education gap, the Turkish government passed
the Program for the Protection of the Family and Dynamic Population
171. ‘ABDULLAH YÛSUF ‘ALÎ, THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’ÂN 189 (11th ed. 2004).
172. There is a vibrant debate among Muslim scholars regarding the progressive or
restrictive nature of Qur’annic interpretation. To a Western reader, this aya may appear
incongruent with modern feminist theory. In reality, this aya merely provides the basis
of a juristic opinion. Under ijtihad, the mufti may greatly expand the rights of women and
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Structure (hereinafter “The Plan”). The Plan embodies the Turkish
government’s efforts to jump-start the AKP’s procapitalist economic
reforms with a goal of full implementation by 2023.178 The govern-
ment admitted that there is still much room for improvement in
rural Turkey to increase women’s involvement in economic and civil
organizations.179 Whereas The Plan does contain provisions to reduce
the informal economy responsible for the drop in women’s education
levels,180 the statistics concerning female economic mobility have not
significantly improved.181
Here, the fatwa may bolster the government’s education policy
objective more effectively than legislation. Because takhayyur per-
mits Diyanet imams to pick jurisprudence from both the HanafI and
Ja’fari schools (unlike legislation from Ankara), fatwas have a more
organic grounding in the region. Basing the fatwa on a Hanafi/Shia
foundation, the Diyanet could encourage pious families to permit
their daughters to engage in state-approved industries outside of
the home. In order to ensure the widest form of acceptance, the
fatwa’s drafters should consult the legal scholars of prominent Shia
imams and the religious leaders of the Alevis.
Coinciding with the issuance of a fatwa, the Diyanet should
reintroduce the Alevis workshops that were prevalent in 2009 and
2010.182 In the past, the Diyanet directly engaged the Alevis popula-
tion to achieve greater understanding and encourage Alevis partici-
pation in society.183 Here, the Diyanet could include presentations
grounded in the Ja’fari school of jurisprudence. The presentations
should aim to provide a religious justification for permitting women
to continue with their education after the eighth grade. Several
Qur’annic sources could serve as the foundation for a Ja’fari inter-
pretation. For example, in the twenty-eighth sura, the Qur’an
reveals: “besides them he found [t]wo women who were keeping
[b]ack (their flocks). He said: ‘What is the matter with you?’ They
said: ‘We cannot water ([o]ur flocks) until the shepherds [t]ake back
(their flocks): And our father is [a] very old man.’ ”184 Shia imams
could use this aya as a foundation for the ijtihad process. Because
ijtihad permits the scholar to include contemporary legislation,185
178. REPUBLIC OF TURK. MINISTRY OF DEV., THE TENTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2014–2018
1 (2014).
179. Id. at 24.
180. Id. at 166–67.
181. See generally Cin & Walker, supra note 12.
182. Derya Özkul, Alevi “Openings” and Politicization of the “Alevi Issue” During the
AKP Rule, 16 TURKISH STUD. 80, 85 (2015).
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information and reasoning from The Plan is also helpful. Conse-
quently, a Shia imam may address a Turkish woman’s right to
finish her secondary education through ijtihad based on the Qur’an
and The Plan’s literature discussing the benefits of women in the
workforce. To ensure uniformity across Islamic sects, the Diyanet
imams, using the concept of takhayyur, could then adopt the Ja’fari
juristic opinion for dissemination to the Sunni population as well.
A counterpoint to creating a pro–boarding school fatwa lies in
the Hanafi School’s narrow interpretation of female agency. The
pre-Republican Hanafi jurists interpreted laws concerning a woman’s
coming of age from a strictly “male vantage point.”186 The roles of
husbands and fathers routinely supersede the wants of their wives
and daughters.187 Therefore, in the realm of female exploration
outside of the home, the Hanafi School provides little progressive
assistance. Consequently, this proposed fatwa will need to utilize
takhayyur and rely primarily on Shia jurisprudential roots.
CONCLUSION
Incrementally liberal fatwas provide a real and viable solution
to Turkey’s education gender gap. The Diyanet, with its imams
thoroughly schooled in the Hanafi legal tradition combined with
participation from the Shia and Alevis communities, can effectively
issue such interpretations. Gradualism is key to altering entrenched
conservative values in eastern Turkey. A fatwa can assuage fears of
daughters living outside of the home by relying on Hanafi and Shia
jurisprudence. Women scholars are making their voices heard. The re-
cent inclusion of two women in the Diyanet evidences the AKP’s
receptivity to feminist causes. Arguably, the conservative population
may not approve of boarding schools, but providing a religious justifi-
cation for girls’ education bolsters already-existing support.
Second, changing cultural attitudes toward women and domes-
tic duties via fatwa provides Turkish women with more educational
opportunities. Using takhayyur to glean the most flexible juristic
opinions from the Hanafi and Ja’fari schools, Diyanet imams could
advocate for women’s empowerment. This Note highlights but a
minute sampling of verses that jurists could employ in fatwa issu-
ance. Admittedly, women who fail to conform with cultural attitudes
and attempt to continue their schooling against their families’ wishes
face physical violence. Again, fatwa may provide a solution. There
is ample Qur’annic basis for abstaining from the use of violence
186. TUCKER, supra note 56, at 151.
187. Id.
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against women for perceived slights to family honor.188 Further, given
Turkey’s modern legal code, ijtihad permits a synthesis of classical
and secular legal interpretation. The modern Muslim, Turkish
community has a voice in the imam’s jurisprudence. The govern-
ment and Diyanet should listen to this voice through these classical
Islamic legal frameworks.
President Erdoðan and the AKP have made great strides in the
improvement of education and closing the gender gap. Their efforts
of late, however, have stalled. The conservatism of eastern Turkey
is ripe for a new religious message from local mosques. The Diyanet
possess the power to implement these much-needed reforms through
progressive fatwas. For the sake of Turkish women, the nation’s
relations with Europe, and the AKP’s political future, President
Erdoðan would do well to embrace religious minorities in Turkey to
form a cohesive, Islamic message for the future.
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